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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

HOWELLS I INC . I
a corporation,
Plaintiff-Respondent,

Case No. 14829

-vsWILLIAM NELSON, aka
WILLIAM LORD ASSOCIATES,
Defendant-Appellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE
OF THE CASE
The Appellant, Howells, Inc., appeals from a
judgment of the Fourth Judicial Court of Utah County,
Honorable J. Robert Bullock presiding.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
On September l, 1976, the Fourth Judicial
District Court awarded Judgment against Defendant in an
amount of $2,852.66 for a bad check which had been
written by Defendant to Plaintiff in that amount. The
trial court, however, refused to hold Defendant, William
Nelson personally liable for said check and further
refused to grant Plaintiff

attorney's fees for the

prosecution of the action.

Thereafter Appellant filed
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notice of appeal.

RELIEf SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellant seeks a ruling from this Court as
a matter of law that Defendant, William Nelson is personally liable for the amount of said check and that
Plaintiff should have been awarded reasonable attorney's
fees.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On February 5, 1976, Defendant, William Nelson
issued a check to Howells, Inc., in an amount of $2,852.66.
The check was drawn on an acount entitled "William Lord
Associates," and was signed by William Nelson.

When

the check was given to Plaintiff's agent, Ettie Mosher,
the Defendant asked Mrs. Mosher to hold the check for
two weeks before depositing the same for payment.

Said

check was deposited on February 26, 1976, after which
it was returned to Plaintiff unpaid, by reason of insufficient funds in the acount of "William Lord Associates."
The check was again submitted on approximately March 2,
1976, with the same result.

The check still has not

been paid.
At the time of trial

on September 1, 1976,

the Defendant did not appear, but was represented by
his Counsel, Mr. Rex Lewis.

The Plaintiff appeared
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through it's agent Ettie Mosher, who testified concerning
the issuance of the check to Plaintiff. Evidence was
introduced to show that there was no corporation
"William Lord Associates" nor was there any certificate
filed for an assumed name with the Secretary of State.
Evidence was also introduced to show that "William
Lord Corporation" was a corporation incorporated in
the State of Utah.
The trial court in its

Findings of Fact,

found that "William Lord Associates" was intended by
Defendant to be an assumed name for "William Lord
Corporation" and therefore refused to hold William
Nelson personally liable for said check.

The trial

court also found that since the check had been given
to Plaintiff by Defendant with a request to hold it
for two weeks before depositing it, the check was a
promissory note and not a check within the meaning
of chapter 15 of title 7, Utah Code Annoated, as amended
1953.
ARGUMENT
THE TRI~L COURT ERRED _IN NOT AWARDING
ATTORNEY'S FEES TO PLAINTIFF.
Chapter 15 of Title 7, Utah Code Annoated,
as amended, 1953, provides:
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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7-15-1. Drawing or issuing against nonexistent account or insufficient funds-Intent
to def~aud-Civil liability-Damages.-(1) Any
person who willfully, with intent to defraud,
makes, draws or issues any check, draft or
order upon any bank, banking association or
other depsitory for the purpose of obtaining
from any person, firm, partnership or corporation any money, merchandise, property,
or other thing of value or paying for any
services, wages, salary or rent, which check.
draft or order which is not honored upon presentment
because the maker, drawer or issuer does not
have the account with the depositary upon
which the check, draft or order has been made
or drawn, or does not have sufficient funds
in such account or sufficient credit with such
depositary for payment of the check, draft
or order in full, shall be liable to the holder
of the check, draft or order in a civil
action as provided in this section.
2)
In such civil action the person making
drawing or issuing the check, draft or order
shall be liable to the holder of it for the
amount thereon, for interest and all costs
of collection, including all court costs
and reasonable attorney's fees.
7-15-2. Civil action-Evidence of intent.In any such civil action any of the following
shall be prima facie evidence that the person
making, drawing or issuing the check, draft
or order did so willfully with an intention
to defraud:
1)
Proof that at the time of issuance, the
maker, drawer or issuer did not have the account
with the depositary upon which the check, draft
or order was made or drawn or did not have
sufficient funds in his account or credit with
the depositary for payment in full of the check,
draft or order, and that he failed within ten
days after receiving notice of nonpayment or
dishonor to pay the check, draft or order; or
2)

Proof that when presentment was made
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within a reasonable time, the maker, drawer
or issuer did not have the account with
the depositary upon which the check, draft
or order was drawn or made or did not have
sufficient funds in such account or credit
with such depositary for payment in full of
the check, draft or order, and that he failed
within ten days after receiving notice of
nonpayment or dishonor to pay the check, draft
or order.
The trial court refused to award attorney's
fees because it was of the opinion the check was not
a check within the definition of the Uniform Commercial
Code (R.9,10).

Section 70A-3-103,

Utah Code Annoated

defines a check as an instrument drawn on a bank which
meets the following requirements:
1)

signed by the maker or drawer;

2)

contain an unconditional promise or

order to pay a sum certain in money and
no other promise, order, obligation, or
power given by the maker or drawer except
as authorized by this chapter;
3)

be payable to order or to bearer.

The problem the trial court apparently found with the
check was whether it was payable on demand or at a
definate time.

Section 70A-3-108,

Utah Code Annoated,

as amended, 1953, defines payable on demand as "instruments
payable on demand include those payable at sight or upon
presentation and those in which no time for payment is
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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stated!'

The latter is certainly the situation in the

instant case.

This entire section of the Uniform Com-

mercial Code also makes it quite clear that all of the
requirements set forth, must appear on the face of the
instrument itself.

It is therefore obvious that the

instrument in question in this case is undoubtedly
a check as it meets all these requirements on its face.
No matter what statements accompanied its presentation,
this instrument was still a check within the definition
of the Utah Uniform Commercial Code.
The trial court also refused to grant attorney's
fees on the basis that there was no evidence of fraudulent
intent on the part of the Defendant because at the time
the check was issued to Plaintiff it was accompanied
with a statement that there were in sufficient funds
in the bank to clear the check but that a deposit would
be made and the check could be deposited in two weeks.
Such a position by the trial court however, was clearly
contra to the provisions of Section 7-15-2
Code Annoated, as amended, 1953.

(2), Utah

This section,as quoted

above states what is prima facie evidence of the intent to
defraud.

The statute provides that proof that the check

was dishonored upon presentation to the payee bank
by reason of insufficient funds in the account and failure
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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of the maker to pay the check within ten days after
he is given notice of the dishonor constitutes prima
facie evidence that the check was fraudulently issued
within the meaning of the statute.

In the instant

case there was clearly no problem

about notice having

been given to the Plaintiff that his check had been
dishonored upon presentment to the bank.

Mrs. Mosher

testified that she personally notified the Defendant
that his check had been dishonored upon two differant
occassions and the check still had not been
at the time of trial

(~.

4).

paid

The trial court's argu-

ment that the statements accompanied with the check
removed any intention to defraud

would apply only

to the sub paragraph one of Section

7-15-2.

However,

the situation in the instant case comes under sub paragraph two in that at the time of presentment

of the

check for payment there was insufficient funds in the
account for payment of the same.

The Defendant's state-

ments to the Plaintiff at the time of issuance of the
check clearly have no bearing upon the second subparagraph
of this statute.
It is readily apparent that the trial court
erred in not awarding Plaintiff reasonable attorney's
fees for this action in that first,
in question was

indeed

the instrument

check within the meaning
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-of the Utah Uniform Commercial Code and, second, that
the situation involved is clearly the situation contemplated in Section 7-15-2(2)
amended, 1953.

Utah Code Annoated, as

Therefore reasonable attorney's fees

should have been awarded.
POINT TWO
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT HOLDING
DEFENDANT WILLIAM NELSON PERSONALLY
LIABLE AND HOLDING THAT THE CHECK WAS A
CORPORATE OBLIGATION.
In this case the trial court refused to
hold the Defendant, William Nelson personally liable
for the issuance of the bad check in question and awarded
judgment against William Lord Corporation.

The court

based its ruling upon its ·finding "That William Lord
Associates was intended by Defendant to be an assumed
name for William Lord Corporation."
No. 8)

(Findings of Fact,

Such a finding by the trial court was clearly

against the weight of the evidence and contra to Utah
Law.
It is a clearly recognized legal principal
and this court has held on numerous occassions that
a corporation is clearly and uniquely a creature of
statute,Shaw v Bailey-McCune Co., 355 P.2d 321, 11

-8-
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Utah

2d

93~

Utah State Building Commission v Great

American Indemnity Company,J40 P.2d 763. 105 Utah 11.
In order for such a legal entity to come into being
strict statutory requirements concerning the creation
of the corporation must be followed if the corporation
is to become incorporatPn and thereby afford the incorporators the protection from liability for which such
corporations are created.
Most courts will, as has this Court, in some
instances however, infer the existence of a defacto
corporation where it is apparent that substantial-efforts
have been made to fullf ill the requirements of the
statutes regarding incorporation but the incorporation
has failed due to some technicality
or unknown by the incorporators.

which was unforseen

In cases of this

type however, it must be shown that substantial efforts
were made on the part of the incorporators to conform
to the requirements of Chapter 10, Title 16, Utah Code
Annoated, as amended 1953.

Vincent Drug Co. v. State

Tax Comm., 17 Utah 2d 202, 407 P.2d 183.
In the instant case, however, we have no such
shwoing,

In fact we have no evidence whatsoever con-

cerning any attempt of any person to incorporate a
-9Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

company known as"William Lord Associates':

All we have

in this case is the inference of the trial court that
since there was a corporation known as William Lord
Corporation then William Lord Associates was intended
to be an assumed name for that corporation.

There

clearly was no evidence to support this finding by
the court as there was no evidence at all concerning
any intentions of the Defendant.

The only conclusion

supported by the evidence is that the Defendant William
Nelson be held personally liable.
This position has been supported by this
Court in Merchants Bank v. Goodfell, 140 P.2d 759.
In that case the court ruled that where a draft was
signed by one person, but had the name of another
person or entity on both the upper and lower corner
of the check,the person signing the check was the one
liable for its payment.

The court in its opinion based

its conclusions on the fact that the name of the account
on which a draft was drawn was not necessarily the only
person who should be held liable for payment of the
check or draft.

This was clearly the situation in the

instant case.
The trial court also did not have sufficient
evidence on which to base its finding that William
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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Lord Associates was intended to be an assumed name for
William Lord Corporation in that Defendant had not
complied with the provisions of Section 42-2-5, Utah
Code Annoated, as amended, 1953.

This section requires:

Every person or persons who shall carry
on, conduct or transact business in this
state under an assumed name, whether such
business be carried on, conducted or transacted
as an individual, association, ownership,
corporation or otherwise, shall file in the
office of the Secretary of State a certificate
setting forth the name under which such
business is, or is to be carried on, conducted or transacted •.•.
This statute is quite clear in its purpose
and scope and its requirements are clearly mandatory and
prerequisite to the transaction of any business within
the State of Utah.

In the instant case the dictates

of the statute clearly were not followed.

No certificate

of assumed and true name was filed entitling William
~ord

Corporation to conduct business in the State of

Utah under the name William Lord Associates.

Therefore

any obligation entered into by "William Lord Associates"
would necessarily have to be, in effect, an obligation
entered into by the person who had attempted to obligate
the company;

in this case the Defendant William Nelson.

The trial court's reasoning and holding in
-11Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

this case sets a very dangerous precedent.
ance of an

The allow-

inferance by any court that any given entity

was actually an assumed name for some corporation is
a very dangerous precedent in that it opens the door
for any person, when sued upon a personal obligation,
to always raise the defense that "this really isn't a
personal obligation, because I always intended to be a
corporation but never quite got around to it."
From the foregoing it is quite evident that
due to the fact that no certificate for an assumed name
was filed with the Secretary of State and also that there

is no Utah corporation named "William Lord Associates"
that the Defendant William Nelson should be personally
liable.
POINT THREE
EVEN IF THE COURT HAD SUFFICIENT GROUNDS TO
CONCLUDE THAT THE CHECK IN QUESTION WAS PROPERLY A CORPORATE OBLIGATION, THE DEFENDANT,
WILLIAM NELSON SHOULD STILL BE PERSONALLY
LIABLE.
Even if the Court did have sufficient grounds
to find that the Defendant William Nelson had always
intended and was in fact doing business as William
Lord Corporation, he should still be held personally
liable.

Most courts hold that generally a director or

officer of a corporation does not incur personal liability
its
wrongful
actsprovided
merely
by
reason
Sponsored by thefor
S.J. Quinney
Law Library.
Funding for digitization
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official character.

However, due to the unique cir-

cumstances of this case, William Nelson should be held
personally liable for the amount of said check by
reason of his being a director of the corporation and
participating in an attempt to defraud the Plaintiff
through William Lord Corporation.
The main basis of this theory is the fact
that the checks were fraudulently issued by a director
of this corporation and,

as argued in point one of

this brief,, the court must presume that the check was
issued with the wilfull intent to defraud the plaintiff.
In Klockner v Keser,

(1971) 20 Colo App 476, 488 P.2d,1135,

the Colorado Supreme Court held the directors of

a

corporation personally liable for bad checks which were
issued on the corporation account and signed by
Defendant.

The pertinent_ rule,

ihe

indicated the Colorado

Court, was that although officers and directors of a
corporation may not be held liable for the torts of the
corporation solely by reason of their office, they may
be held liable personally for the results of tortious,
fraudulent

misrepresentations

where they approved of

and sanctioned the making of such representations and
knew or should have known of the fallsity of the rep-13-
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-resentations and the consequential damages which were
likely to result therefrom.
A similar holding was also reached in the
1973 case of Meehen v. Adams Enterprises, Inc., 507
P.2d 849, 211 Kan 253.

In that

case, as in Kleckner,

the Kansas Supreme Court ruled that the officers or
directors of a corporation shall be personally liable
for a bad check "if it was apparent that at the time
the checks were drawn the officers or directors knew
or should have known that there were no funds in the
bank to pay the check." supra, 851, 852.
This same result was also reached in a
New York case, Lippman Packing Corporation v. Rose
(1953) 120 NYS 2d 461.

In that case the court again

ruled that officers or directors of the corporation
would be personally liable for a bad check where the
Defendant was chargeable with the knowledge of the
state of the corporation's bank account.

In Lippman

it was again emphasized that the Defendant's conduct
ammounted to actionable fraud and therefore held him
personally liable.
In each of the above cases it was noted

that

the major reason for the Court granting relief to the
Plaintiffs against the Defenant

officer or director
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of the corporation personally was that there was substantial evidence that the Defendant knew or should
have known the status of the bank account of the corporation and that, nonetheless, he still wrote a check
which was subsequently dishonored upn presentation.
This is exactly the situation in the instant case.
In this case,by the presumption of Section

7-15-2(2),

Utah Code Annoated, argued in point one, we have
prima facie evidence that this check was issued with
the wilfull

intent to defraud the Plaintiff with no

evidence to rebut that presumption.
follows that the situation in

It therefore _

this case is directly

analogous to the three cases quoted above.

This

Court then, in recognizing the soundness of the logic
behind the holdings in the above three cases, is therefore urged to adopt a similar rule and hold the Defendant, William Nelson

personally liable for the amount

of this check.
CONCLUSION
Appellant respectfully submits that the trial
court erred in not awarding Plaintiff reasonable attorney's
fees and in not holding Defendant William Nelson personally
liable for the amount of said check plus
of court, and reasonable attorney's fees.

interest.~costs

The trial
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